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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
impulse test, on the ground that an impulse to do harm by one
who knows the difference between right and wrong can not be
irresistible. State v. Painter, 135 W. Va. 106, 63 S.E.2d 86 (1950);
State v. Beckner, 118 W. Va. 430, 190 S.E. 693 (1937); State v.
Fugate, 103 W. Va. 653, 138 S.E. 318 (1927); State v. Evans, 94 W.
Va. 47, 117 S.E. 885 (1923); State v. Barker, 92 W. Va. 583, 115 S.E.
421 (1922); State v. Cook, 69 W. Va. 717, 72 S.E. 1025 (1911); State
v. Maier, 36 W. Va. 757, 15 S.E. 991 (1892). This position has been
criticized as being disharmonious with medical knowledge, and a
departure by the court from the judicial function and an assumption of the role of an expert medical witness. Keedy, Irresistible
Impulse as a Defense in CriminalLaw, 100 U. OF PA. L. RIv. 956,
988-89 (1952).
It would seem that there will continue to be disparities between those courts which attempt to adjust their standard of criminal liability to meet the realities of human behavior as revealed
by the research of medical science which has led to the conclusion,
at least in our time, that man may be a pawn to the intricate and
hidden forces in his own mind; and those courts which adhere
to the historical concept of criminal liability that must be juxtaposed to what has been considered best for a civilized society: that
man must meet a certain minimum standard of conduct regardless
of his infirmities unless the weakness is so marked as to fall within
the strict test for insanity. GutrmACHER 8 WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY
AND THE LAw (1952); HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 50-51 (1881).
T. B. M.
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statements, by published letter and word of mouth, that P attorney
was a shyster, deceiver, betrayer of clients, and other defamatory
matter in general. D appealed from a temporary injunction
granted in favor of P by the circuit court. Held, that equity has
no jurisdiction to enjoin the publication of defamatory statements
relating to personality and professional conduct. Kwass v. Kersey,
81 S.E.2d 237 (W. Va. 1954).
Thus there was presented squarely before the court a question
of law frequently debated by some of our greatest legal scholars,
that is, whether a court of equity has jurisdiction to restrain the
publication of defamation as such? Though the debate may continue as to what the law should be, there is no doubt as to what
the cases hold. The decisions are legion that equity will not
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enjoin mere defamation. Yood v. Dody, 37 Ohio App. 574 (1930).
Thompson v. Union, 126 N.J. Eq. 119, 8 A.2d 130 (1939). The
modern cases, however, have nibbled substantially into the rule
by providing for equitable relief where certain other factors are
present in addition to the defamation. A few of these exceptions
will be noted below.
Whether we may give any reasons other than purely historical
for a doctrine which at first blush is so arbitrary and unjust is of
course not within the purview of this short comment. For one of
the best articles which argues eloquently that courts of equity
should have jurisdiction to grant injunctions in such cases, see
Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation, 29 HAiv. L. REv.
640 (1915). It is interesting that the court in the instant case
noted that "while the article by Dean Pound is very persuasive,
we do not agree with the conclusion expressed therein."
The principal case is interesting mainly for the collateral
decisions of the court necessary in order to overcome some apparently insurmountable obstacles in the way of the final result.
First, the court admits that equity would have jurisdiction to
restrain the publication of defamation in cases involving conspiracy, intimidation, or coercion. These are some of the more
common exceptions to the general rule under discussion that
equity has no jurisdiction to enjoin defamation. Gariepy v.
Springer, 318 Ill. App. 523, 48 N.E.2d 572 (1943). In the instant
case P very forcefully alleged in his bill for relief that D conspired
with another to destroy P's law business; that D attempted by such
defamation to coerce P to testify as a witness in litigation in which
D was interested; and that D had made threats of bodily harm to P.
The cause came up on demurrer where it is a fundamental rule
of pleading that all facts well pleaded in the bill are taken for
confessed. Nevertheless these unequivocal allegations which would
seemingly qualify for equity relief were rejected by the terse
remark that such allegations were denied in the answer.
The second main obstacle which stood in the way of refusing
relief was passed over with equal ease, that is, the right to practice
law is a property right, Unger v. Landlords' Management Co., 114
N.J. Eq. 68, 168 Ad. 229 (1933); hence defamation tending to
deprive P of such a right should properly be enjoined by a court
of equity. That a property right is being infringed upon is
perhaps the most frequent ground for equitable relief in defamation cases. After noticing both the fact that the right to practice
law is a property right and that the similar right of a doctor had
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been the subject of an injunction in a prior holding, Sloan v.
Mitchell, 113 W. Va. 506, 168 S.E. 800 (1933), the problem was
dismissed by saying, "Since there is no defamation of tangible
personal property alleged or shown in this record, we do not
think that any question of defamation or disparagement of tangible
personal property can be here considered." No case was cited after
this rather obscure remark and just how this answered P's contention that equity should protect this valuable property right is
hard to understand.
The third and perhaps most interesting point is raised by
the court's reference to the right of a jury trial. It was said that
if a right of trial by jury existed prior to the adoption of the West
Virginia Constitution, the legislature can not legally extend equity
jurisdiction to such defamation cases and thus deprive a litigant of
a jury trial against his will since the constitution guaranteps the
right to trial by jury where the controversy exceeds twenty dollars
exclusive of interest and costs.
The answer to this objection is that no legislative extension
of equity jurisdiction is presented. Rather it is just an ordinary
bill in equity seeking relief from wanton destruction of a valuable
property right. The right to such relief is based on the ancient
ground of jurisdiction that to refuse such relief would result in a
multiplicity of actions at law for damages, irreparable harm to his
law practice, and inadequacy of a legal remedy in general. The
exercise of equity jurisdiction in such a case as this has nothing
to do with the situation where the legislature cuts off a person's
right to a jury trial by granting equity jurisdiction to a field of
controversy hitherto completely foreign to equity.
Nevertheless, the court in the present case denied the jurisdiction in unequivocal terms. The decision was rendered in the face
of a most authoritative article contending for an opposite result
and a most incisive dissenting opinion pointing out the rather
obscure foundations of the decision as emphasized in this comment. However, it would seem to be too broad an assumption that
the present case is a condemnation of the modern trend in equity
to exercise jurisdiction not only where the legal remedy is inadequate but where the legal remedy is not as practical or efficient as
the equitable relief might be. Buskirk v. Sanders, 70 W. Va. 363,
73 S.E. 937 (1912); Consumers' Gas Util. Co. v. Wright, 130 W. Va.
508, 44 S.E.2d 584 (1947).
It would seem though that it will take an unusual case indeed
to induce the court to grant equitable relief in a case of defamation.
C. B. F.
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